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## ABBREVIATIONS

ABLH	Association for Better Land Husbandry
Ag.	Agriculture
AIC	Agricultural Information Centre
AKF	Aga Khan Foundation
ASALs	Arid and semi-arid lands
ASIP	Agriculture Sector Investment Programme
CAHW	Community Animal Health Worker
CBO	Community-based organisation
CGIAR	Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
CRP	Country Review Paper
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DFI	Direct Funding Initiative
DFID	Department for International Development
DFID (EA)	DFID East Africa Office
DFID (Kenya)	DFID's Kenya Programme management
EMI	Embu, Meru and Isiolo Project
FY	Financial Year
GDR	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GoK	Government of Kenya
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
IDA	International Development Association, World Bank
ILRI	International Livestock Research Centre
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International NGO
KARI	Kenya Agricultural Research Institute
KETRI	Kenya Trypanosomiasis Research Institute
KIFCON	Indigenous Forest Conservation project
KRSP	Kwale Rural Support Programme
LPP	Livestock Production Plant
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MoA	Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture
MTR	Mid-term review
NARP	National Agricultural Research Project
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NR	Natural Resources
NRPAD	Natural Resources Policy and Advisory Department
OPR	Output to purpose review
OVI	Objectively Verifiable Indicator
PAWS	Protected Area and Wildlife Services
PAWSIS	Protected Area and Wildlife Services Interim Support Project
PCN	Project Concept Note
PCR	Project Completion Report

PEC	DFID Project and Evaluation Committee – now called the Portfolio Review Committee (PRC)
PHC	Primary Health Care
PIMS	Policy Information Marker System
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisals
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PY2	Project Year
R&D	Research and development
RLED	Rural Livelihoods and Environment Department
RNR	Renewable Natural Resources
RNRCSP	Renewable Natural Resources Country Strategy Paper
RNRKS	RNR Knowledge Strategy
SA	Sustainable Agriculture
SAG	Sustainable Agriculture PIMS Marker
SAS	Sustainable Agriculture Strategy
SD	Social Development
SDA	Social Development Adviser
SDP	R&D Support to the Smallholder Dairy Sector Project
SHG	Self-help group
SIP	Sector Investment Programme
SL	Sustainable Livelihoods
SMCP	Smallholder Marketing and Certification Project
SWAP	Sector Wide Approaches
TBA	Traditional birth attendant
TCO	Technical Co-operation Officer
WPDP	Wajir Pastoralists Programme

## ISSUES AND LESSONS

### Strategies

1. Neither the SAS nor the Kenya RNRCSP were strategies in the conventional business sense. They were written statements of RNR advisers' then position and intent and were primarily seen as mechanisms for influencing prioritisation, and funding, within DFID.
2. In the event, neither was effective in influencing prioritisation and funding decisions within DFID's Kenya programme, or the selection of projects within the SA programme. This does not mean that they might not necessarily have been effective mechanisms for influencing allocation of resources within the programme if circumstances in Kenya had been different. Their ineffectiveness partially reflects the difficulty of working in Kenya in the mid to late 1990s. DFID's overall financial support to Kenya did not grow in this period, reflecting the increasingly poor governance and economic context. Historical commitments to existing RNR projects meant that any new strategy would have required increasing the size of the RNR programme relative to other sectors. However, this lack of influence of RNR strategies can be contrasted with the effectiveness of the relationship between the Kenya programme's RNR and SD Advisers in promoting and developing the Direct Funding Initiative under the same constraints.
3. In the absence of reform by GoK, the actual focus of the SA programme, with relatively small investments managed by NGOs and aiming at direct poverty impacts and a modest investment in increasing voice and policy engagement, was reasonable and correct.

### *Lesson:*

- i. During the study period, it is probable that many of what were termed strategies within DFID were not strategies, but rather statements of intent by differing parts of DFID, aimed at an internal DFID audience and intended to influence the allocation of resources within the organisation. Experience in Kenya suggests that such 'statements of intent' would be more effective at influencing internal DFID resource allocation if they explicitly identified strong linkages to the concerns of other advisory groups.*

### Projects with government

4. Most DFID support to Kenya in the 1990s has been to a series of sectorally-based projects that have operated within a deteriorating and generally unresponsive institutional and economic environment. RNR projects reviewed were efficiently managed, but effectiveness of support to government services was severely

compromised by the poor institutional and economic environment. The prospects for wide and sustained impact on poverty or policy from these projects are remote.

*Lesson:*

- ii. *Sector-based projects which are dependent on economic and public sector reform, in countries with a track record of slow or failed reform, are extremely high risk. It must be recognised that there is often little either the project or its counterpart government organisation can do to manage this risk. Such projects should only be supported when the expected benefits are correspondingly large.*

### **Projects with NGOs**

- 5. Progress with economic and public administrative reform by Government of Kenya (GoK) was disappointing. DFID responded by funding NGO-managed projects under the Direct Funding Initiative (DFI), where direct poverty benefits were assumed not to rely on substantial GoK reform. This was a reasonable strategy. However, experience with the DFI projects shows that their effectiveness has still been severely constrained by the poor national economic environment. The sustainability of the local poverty impacts achieved is also at risk because of the questionable long-term incentives for participation by beneficiaries in the NGO-established community-based organisations.

*Lessons:*

- iii. *Support for NGO projects does not remove the problem of a poor institutional and economic environment. The potential for sustainable poverty reduction will still be constrained.*
- iv. *Improved institutional analysis and monitoring is required for NGO projects if impacts are to be sustained.*

### **Sustainable Livelihoods approach**

- 6. The evaluation concludes that there is no evidence that adoption of a SL approach, post 1998, has had a significant impact upon the approach adopted to RNR programme development or project management. Of most relevance, the SL approach does not appear to have led to development of a stronger poverty analysis with a clear identification of how best future DFID support to the SA sector might be structured to address the underlying causes of poverty.

*Lesson:*

- v. *Where the institutional and economic environment is unsupportive, the SL approach will not necessarily lead to significant changes in RNR programme development or project management and performance.*

### **Advisers and teamwork**

12. Commenting on each other's work is a significant workload for DFID advisers. Analytical tools, such as logframes and the SL framework, are supposed to foster teamwork. There is, however, little evidence that teamworking significantly influenced the design and implementation of RNR projects. For example, within the present RNR programme, the consistent weakness of projects' efforts to address institutional sustainability is evident.

*Lesson:*

- vi. *Use of tools and approaches – such as logframes and the sustainable livelihoods framework – will not be successful by themselves at fostering effective teamwork within the programme advisory corps. Effective teamwork will only occur when advisers see a clear coincidence of interest, as occurred between the RNR and SD Advisers under the DFI.*

## SUMMARY

### Programme development

1. At the start of the 1990s, DFID support to sustainable agriculture mainly comprised a series of projects which supported GoK's national agricultural research and communications services. DFID support for district level agriculture service delivery activities, principally through the EMI project, had recently ceased, although with the expectation that further support would be developed. In response to a DFID (EA) policy decision to withdraw from infrastructure development, support for construction of rural infrastructure had also wound down.
2. Following the death of the Senior RNR Adviser for Kenya in 1992, development of the SA portfolio drifted until 1994, when appointment of a new Senior RNR Adviser was rapidly followed by approval of several projects, principally with GoK. These medium-term commitments to upstream research and communications meant that scope to rapidly develop any executable strategy in response to the 1995 Kenyan RNR strategy would require an increase in resources above the then level of around £5m per annum.
3. The RNR strategy published in December 1995 identified six possible programme outputs, of which five were relevant to the SAS. A key assumption of the strategy was that GoK would implement significant economic and public sector reform. Two outputs were addressed by new phases of on-going projects (National Agricultural Research Project II and the STEP/Radio Project). Possible new support identified included to the proposed Agricultural Sector Investment Programme, to the dairy sector and a new, district level area-based project, piloting alternative service delivery mechanisms. The possibility of supporting further projects under the Direct Funding Initiative (DFI), which supported NGO-managed area level interventions which directly impacted on the poor was briefly mentioned although was not a prominent part of the strategy.
4. Failure of GoK commitment to reform constrained both opportunities to develop new activities with GoK and with others, due to DFID's reluctance to commit significant



new, additional resources to the programme. Since 1995, only one new project involving government as a principal partner, R&D Support to the Smallholder Dairy Sector, has been designed and implemented. The other four new projects developed and implemented between 1995 and 1999 have all been within the DFI. Implementation of these new projects has not entailed an expansion in the annual RNR spend.

## **Programme performance**

### *Projects' efficiency*

5. Performance ratings derived from DFID monitoring reports for the six projects reviewed within the evaluation are summarised below. The evaluation concludes that marking of achievement of project outputs is accurate. Outputs dealing with technical production and research issues were of consistent high quality and have potential for impact at household level in terms of increased livestock and crop production and cash generation. Project management has varied from good to excellent and projects have, on the whole, successfully addressed management issues raised during DFID monitoring.

<b>Project</b>	<b>Output</b>	<b>Purpose</b>
NARP II	2	4
R&D support to the smallholder dairy sector (SDP)	1	X
Smallholder Marketing and Certification	2	2
Dairy Goat and Animal Healthcare	2	3
Oxfam Wajir Pastoralists Programme	2	2
Kwale Rural Support Programme	2	3
Key:	1 = Likely to be completely achieved; 2 = likely to be largely achieved; 3= likely to be partially achieved; 4= only likely to be achieved to a very limited extent; 5= unlikely to be realised; X= too early to judge	

### *Projects' effectiveness and impacts*

6. Project Completion Report scores for DFID projects completed in the 1990s show that the performance of those marked sustainable agriculture is slightly worse than that of the general population of projects. In the opinion of the Kenya Programme Officer, effectiveness in most sectors, outside of health and population, has been comparable.

7. The effectiveness of all projects has been compromised to varying degrees by weak poverty and governance analyses during design and consequentially have lacked effective approaches to dealing with the generally uncondusive institutional and economic environment. This was particularly marked for NARP II, where widespread impact depended on the functioning of an effective government extension system. Once this system effectively collapsed following withdrawal of IDA support in 1996, the project was not able to identify sustainable alternatives with wide potential coverage.

8. Aspects included in design and implementation of SDP, which is also a research project working with government, clearly show the office's learning from the difficulties with NARP II. These include working from the start with a plurality of partners, deliberately selecting a representative from the Ministry of Agriculture in a position to influence internal ministry policy debates as project team leader rather than a researcher, and a vigorous and proactive strategy of translating research into clear policy messages for politicians.

9. With the exception of SDP and NARP II, strong and effective community-based organisations are crucial to the delivery of outputs and the sustainability of poverty impacts. Evidence from the evaluation throws into question how sustainable these CBOs will be post project support. This undermines prospects for sustainable achievements at purpose level as a means of having a direct impact on the poor. These issues could be addressed by the project implementers contracting in organisational development expertise, and in one case, providing technical support to enable the main CBO to respond better to its members' interests.

10. All projects reviewed have had, or are likely to have, some impact on household production and/or income levels. However, the lack of poverty analysis makes it difficult to link with confidence increased production and income with livelihood outcomes. This finding supports that of Booth and White's (1999) review of 13 post-1997 DFID Country Strategy Papers,<sup>1</sup> which concluded that CSPs failed to clearly show the linkages between

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<sup>1</sup> David Booth and Howard White, 'How Can Country Strategies Be A More Effective Tool For Poverty Reduction?'

the poverty analysis in their 'Poverty Challenge' sections and the DFID activities identified. Excepting Wajir and SDP, projects have allocated few resources to monitoring impact. For other projects, it is extremely difficult to assess either the extent or probability of impact, although in most cases it is likely to be limited relative to the level of expenditure.

### *National programme impacts and influence*

11. In practice the SA programme has developed as two clusters of projects; those projects under the DFI which were primarily designed to have direct area level impacts on poor people; and those projects with GoK which were intended to have national level impacts. To date, there is no evidence of national level impacts from the SA portfolio of projects, although it is possible that SDP may have such impacts in the near future.

12. All projects, and DFID (Kenya), were aware that broad poverty impact was also dependent on influencing wider economic and political processes. However, until recently this was not a major priority of the projects or DFID management in an environment in which neither of two major mechanisms for influencing GoK has proven effective. Conditionalities have not worked, and strengthening policy debate through provision of information has not yielded the intended impact in an environment in which all aspects of the reform process are politicised.

13. There is now one initiative underway in DFID (EA) to feed the experience and lessons learned from DFI projects into national policy discussion forums to influence policy.

### **Programme management**

#### *The contribution of strategies*

14. There is no evidence that either the SAS or the 1995 RNR strategy impacted on the portfolio of projects implemented. Evidence of impact would have required an

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Issues From A Review Of The "New" CSPs'. Paper prepared for the Joint Economist/SDA Retreat, 1999.

expansion in programme resources and in the absence of such an expansion, any impacts were masked by the overwhelming influence of pre-1995 commitments on the programme actually implemented in the mid to late 1990s. The 1995 RNR strategy was really a written statement of intent by the Senior RNR Adviser to be used in influencing the composition of the entire DFID Kenya programme. Under this criterion, the most effective approach to influencing the pattern of DFID support was not the RNR strategy but the coincidence of interest between the Senior SDA and RNR Advisers over the value of the DFI approach.

### **Monitoring and evaluation**

15. Monitoring of projects by DFID has been of variable quality. Quality has relied on the skill and experience of those involved rather than on the strengths of the monitoring system itself. While the logframe matrix has been used, it is clear that the logframe process/approach has not. The use of logframes has imposed a considerable administrative burden on project implementers and logframes have generally been used systematically to manage projects' operations. While attention appears to have been almost entirely focused at output level and below, it is unclear why many logframes still fail to reflect important project activities and outputs. Logframe purpose and goal level OVIs and assumptions are consistently weak and not monitored by either project staff or advisers. Neither is the logframe approach used as an approach to identifying and testing the major assumptions that underpin project designs. While this probably reflects the concerns of those involved to address immediate problems and deliver short-term tangibles it also may reflect the lack of effective engagement by cross-cutting advisers in the projects.

#### *Lesson learning between projects*

16. Projects have not always been sufficiently proactive at looking for lessons on good practice elsewhere that would inform their work. Some organisations, such as Action Aid, are better at actively considering outside experience than others. Organising lesson learning between partners by DFID (EA) was weak. This may have reflected the

situation when advisers had responsibilities over three countries, but now that Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya each has an individual SDA and RNR adviser, advisers in Kenya have had more space to focus on lesson learning and developing strategy. It is also intended to contract out monitoring and evaluation to a regional consultancy.

#### *Team work*

17. Experience with even the DFI projects has been that effectiveness is severely constrained by the poor national economic and environmental environment. Effectiveness of the DFI projects has also been compromised by their failure to address whether the incentives for participation within the CBOs created existed. This suggests that the level of effectiveness and impact of DFID RNR investments would be enhanced by more effective use of the wider advisory corps' skills and experience in these areas. The basic culture of the advisory corps is a collegiate one. This seems to have contributed to the somewhat paradoxical situation in which, while the RNR advisers and cross-cutting advisers are aware of, and devote considerable time to commenting on, each others work there is a lack of evidence of influence of the cross-cutters on the RNR strategy and of the experience of the RNR sector on DFID work at a strategic level. While obvious, the strength and effectiveness of the relationship between the Senior SDAs and RNR Advisers, particularly in the mid 1990s, suggests that effective and sustained relationships between cross-cutting and sectoral advisers requires a clearly seen coincidence of interest by both parties. As the SDAs become increasingly involved in the development of the strategic national Poverty Reduction Strategy, the level of engagement between SDA and RNR advisers is reducing and the RNR Adviser is increasingly working with the Civil Society Adviser.

#### *The Sustainable Livelihoods approach*

18. Initial attempts by the Senior RNR Adviser to develop a district-based SL project in 1999, using NGOs as the primary management partner, did not progress beyond the PCN stage. There was scepticism in the office over what was new in the proposal presented. There is little evidence that either advisers or administrators see how the

approach can add value to the disciplinary approaches already in place. Discussion has focused on how to use the SL ‘framework’, rather than on the SL principles and their implications for programme development and management.

19. Assuming that the SL approach is being promoted by RLED in response to gaps in DFID’s present approach, the major issue for present SA programme management is what, if any, will be the impact of the failure to operationalise the SL approach within the office? The evaluation team concludes that operationalising the SL approach would have little impact unless the present signs of reform by GoK were followed through. Such commitment would then present a significantly different set of challenges, including:

- What are the major constraints to long-term sustainable growth in the RNR sector, which is still the dominant economic sector in the Kenyan economy?
- To what degree will these long-term constraints be addressed by national level economic and public administrative reform?
- To what degree will there be a need for sector level support?
- Who has the comparative advantage to provide the sector level support?
- How will the sector level support be structured, given increasing recognition about the lack of impact of projectised support shown in increased interest in the donor community in the use of sector investment programmes, when the project approach dominates in the RNR sector?

20. Under such a scenario, SL does offer one approach to how the RNR Adviser might engage with other stakeholders, both within DFID and outside, to define a new strategy that both reflected widespread ownership within the office and realistically addressed the wider institutional issues that have constrained effectiveness of the programme to date.

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

1.1 This country study is part of an evaluation with the following overall objectives:

- (a) To review the extent to which DFID funded sustainable agriculture activities since 1994 have been guided by, consistent with, and supportive of, the Sustainable Agriculture Strategy (SAS);
- (b) To assess the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of selected DFID sustainable agriculture projects under implementation since the early 1990s;
- (c) To assess the impact of these projects, and of the SAS overall, in contributing to reducing poverty, improved food security, and improvements in the productivity of land and aquatic resources;
- (d) To identify good practice in the design and implementation of sustainable agriculture projects, and the sustainable livelihoods approach.

1.2 Among the conclusions of the first stage of this evaluation, which reviewed the development of the SAS by DFID (London) and the overall SA programme, were that:

- The sustainable agriculture strategy was developed under pressures to reassert the identity of NR activities within DFID. Partly as a result of those pressures, the conceptual underpinnings were limited with regard to core definitions of sustainability and the poor. Attempts were made to refine these concepts but were not put into practice. Despite acknowledgement of the importance of policy and institutional change, treatment was limited compared to other strategies being promoted within DFID at the same time.
- Dissemination of the SAS was slow and slight. A two-year gap exists between development of the detailed strategy for internal use and preparation of a shorter version for wider dissemination. The strategy was mainly promoted by NRPAD through influence on and support for Country Strategy Papers, often through the personal intervention of the Head, NRPAD. Yet the need of NR Advisers for a clear and coherent strategy to promote their perspectives in negotiations with other advisers was well recognised.
- RNR Country Strategy Papers developed since 1994 are found to be broadly consistent with the SAS, but contain few explicit references. Some specific

themes such as integration of research and NGO activities with bilateral country programmes are not addressed consistently and the RNRCSPs display considerable diversity, reflecting flexibility in adaptation of the strategy to local conditions.

1.3 The Kenya programme is one of four DFID country programmes selected for inclusion within the second stage of the evaluation. Country programme evaluations primarily focus on lesson learning at a strategic level, based on reviewing both the general development of the Kenya SA programme since production of the Sustainable Agriculture Strategy in 1994 and a range of SA projects.

1.4 The evaluation draws upon data derived from desk reviews of DFID file material, reviews of six projects, including field visits to three, and interviews with both DFID and other partner organisations' staff involved in the past and present implementation of DFID's Kenyan SA strategy. Projects reviewed are described in Table 1.



**Table 1 Description of projects reviewed**

<p><b>National Agricultural Research Project, Phase 2 (Desk review)</b>  Duration: 1994-2000 (Phase 1987-1994)  Major Partner: KARI (GoK)  Purpose: Increased use of demand-driven technology by delivery systems and end-users.  Total DFID cost: £11.00m</p>
<p><b>R&amp;D support to the smallholder dairy sector (Desk and Field review)</b>  Duration: 1997-1999 Phase 1, 1999-2003 Phase 2  Major Partner: International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) (CGIAR Centre)  Purpose: Improved access by smallholder dairy farmers to technologies, advice and information.  Total DFID cost: £1.972m</p>
<p><b>Oxfam Wajir Pastoralists Programme (Desk and Field review)</b>  Duration: 1994-1997 Phase 1, 1997-2000 Phase 2  Major Partner: Oxfam Kenya (NGO)  Purpose: To achieve sustainable changes in pastoral livelihoods and increase participation of target communities in institutions which influence their lives.  Total DFID cost: £1.854m</p>
<p><b>Dairy Goat and Animal Healthcare Project (Desk and Field review)</b>  Duration: Phase 1 1996-1999, Phase 2 1999-2002  Major Partner: Farm AFRICA (NGO)  Purpose: Productivity of local goats increased through better management, access to sustainable healthcare and genetic improvement, and of dairy cattle from better access to sustainable healthcare systems.  Total DFID cost: £1.14m</p>
<p><b>Smallholder Marketing and Certification (Desk review)</b>  Duration: Phase 1 1996-1999, Phase 2 under negotiation  Major partner: Association for Better Land Husbandry (ABLH), Kenya (NGO)  Purpose: To demonstrate that smallholder farming households' incomes can be increased significantly through development of sustainable farmer-controlled businesses producing and marketing conservation products into domestic and international markets.  Total DFID cost: £1.964m</p>
<p><b>Kwale Rural Support Programme (Desk review)</b>  Duration: Phase 1 1997-1999, Phase 2 1999-2003  Major Partner: Aga Khan Foundation  Purpose: To establish viable and sustainable CBOs at sub-village, village and supra-village levels, that enable communities to raise income levels.  Total DFID cost: £1.579m</p>

## CHAPTER 2

### NATIONAL CONTEXT

2.1 Kenya has a per capita GNP of US\$280. Between 1985 and 1995, annual population growth of 2.7% and weak economic growth meant that per capita incomes did not rise and numbers in poverty increased. This trend has continued post 1995. Income distribution is highly skewed and approximately 50% of the population, 14 million people, exist on less than US\$1 a day (1985 prices).

2.2 Agriculture is still the largest sector of the economy, despite a decline in its share of GDP from 34% in 1972 to 29% in 1996. Agriculture also has a significant impact on other sectors of the economy. It makes an indirect contribution of roughly another 30% of GDP in the manufacturing and service sectors through the transport and processing of agricultural products. Three agricultural products – tea, coffee and horticultural products – account for over half foreign exchange earnings and the sector provides close to 70% of all employment.

2.3 While the poorest live in the 80% of rural Kenya classified as arid or semi-arid, in absolute terms the largest number of the poor live in the 20% classified as having high potential for agriculture. In the high potential areas, land holdings tend to be scattered and small due to subdivision and problems of land tenure. Poverty in these areas is driven by the lack of access to resources and economic opportunity. While opportunities for increased agricultural productivity exist, and if implemented, would impact on poverty, pro-poor growth also requires a significant increase in off-farm employment opportunities.

2.4 Mugabe (1997) summarises the main environmental problems in Kenya as follows: soil loss and degradation; loss of biodiversity; pollution, particularly of water bodies; and destruction of forests and wildlife. Underlying drivers of environmental degradation include population growth (although Mugabe acknowledges the complexity

of this issue, referring to the conclusions of Tiffen *et al.* (1994) from Machakos district); land tenure, and policy implementation and market failures.

2.5 Particularly since legal reform in 1992, NGOs have assumed an increasing role in providing services to poor Kenyans, although their reach has been relatively modest. Donor attitudes to supporting the NGO sector have varied. However some, including DFID, have in the absence of substantive movement from government, channelled an increasing proportion of their support through the sector.

## CHAPTER 3

### DFID STRATEGIC CONTEXT

3.1 DFID's programme in Kenya has been run out of the DFID (East Africa) office in Nairobi throughout the 1990s. Review of CSP<sup>2</sup> documentation suggests that the office's analysis of the root causes of slow development in Kenya has not changed significantly throughout this period. Positive impacts on poverty and aid effectiveness both require faster economic reform, improved governance and policy implementation and decreased corruption.

3.2 DFID's stated strategy throughout the 1990s has not altered significantly. The office has sought to support macro-economic and public sector reform by GoK through provision of programme aid, linked to conformance by GoK with IMF/IDA economic conditionalities. Complementing this approach would be a portfolio of projects designed to address key long-term growth constraints and/or to provide sustainable direct benefits and opportunities for poor people.

3.3 Table 2 suggests that throughout the period DFID has been willing to commit significant resources to Kenya. However, the above strategy has never been fully implemented. Despite withdrawal of support by the IMF and IDA on two occasions, in 1991 and 1998, GoK has failed to consistently and effectively implement reform. Opportunities for DFID (Kenya) to extend substantial programme aid in support of reform have therefore been limited and no programme aid has been extended since 1994. In practice, the DFID programme has therefore comprised a series of projects which have operated within a generally unsupportive policy and institutional environment and the office has been operating under the low case scenario that was formalised in the 1998 CSP.

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<sup>2</sup> Including Country Review Paper, 1992; Country Strategy Paper, 1995 and Country Strategy Paper, 1998.

**Table 2 Indicative annual aid framework for DFID’s Kenya programme (current £m)**

Source	Indicative Aid Framework in FY (current £m)							
	91/92	92/93	93/94	94/95	95/96	96/97	97/98	98/99
CRP, 1992	26.00	31.00	25.00	25.00				
CSP, 1995					27.35	25.08	18.79	
CSP, 1998 (Low Case) <sup>3</sup>							28.4	26.4
CSP, 1998 (High Case)							28.4	36.6

3.4 Table 3 sets out actual expenditure by sector within the Kenya programme. Trends to note over the period include that:

- There has been a consistent underspend in the programme (Table 3) relative to resources potentially available under the aid framework (Table 2). Annual expenditures have fluctuated between £15.76m and £28.96m. Expenditure in 1992/93 was exceptionally high as DFID increased support during the 1992 multiparty elections. Expenditure in 1998/99 was exceptionally high due to expenditure in the health and population sector. Expenditure in this sector has increased since the office believe that opportunities for impact, in the absence of GoK reform, are greatest in this sector. Effectiveness in this sector is closely related to funding NGOs to act as *de facto* alternative service providers to government.
- Although the office has withdrawn support from some sectors, it has maintained a presence across a wide range of sectors throughout the period.
- Expenditure in the RNR sector remained significant throughout the study period.

<sup>3</sup> The 1998 CSP lays out two scenarios. The high case scenario is contingent on evidence that funds would be effectively used under SWAP type support and that the DFID/GoK partnership was strong. The low case scenario represents a relatively modest decrease from previous funding levels [20%] and an increase in channeling of funds through NGOs, the private sector and wider civil society.

**Table 3 Percentage expenditure by sector for Kenya programme (FY 91/92-98/99)**

Sector	% of expenditure by sector from FY91/92 to 98/99							
	91/92	92/93	93/94	94/95	95/96	96/97	97/98	98/99
<b>SAG</b>	9	7	10	16	26	22	28	14
<b>Other RNR</b>	13	6	6	2	7	4	3	1
<b>Business &amp; Financial Services</b>	1	1	2	5	6	2	5	5
<b>Education</b>	12	17	15	16	15	8	12	9
<b>Energy</b>	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Health &amp; Population</b>	9	11	11	23	32	21	22	33
<b>Water &amp; Sanitation</b>	9	9	6	0	0	3	1	2
<b>Public Administration</b>	14	18	9	10	4	4	7	8
<b>Rural Community Dev.</b>	2	0	0	0	0	2	1	2
<b>Manufacturing</b>	1	0	3	8	7	14	11	8
<b>Transport and Storage</b>	25	18	14	13	2	0	0	3
<b>Urban &amp; Industrial Development</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<b>Not allocable by sector</b>	2	12	24	6	0	19	7	13
<b>Total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
<b>Total Expenditure (£m)</b>	19.53	25.23	21.69	17.68	15.67	19.06	18.30	28.96

## CHAPTER 4

### SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE PORTFOLIO

#### Sustainable Agriculture within the RNR Portfolio

4.1 The sustainable agriculture portfolio is defined in this evaluation as those projects marked 2 (significant) or 4 (principal) under the PIMS Rio Marker for sustainable agriculture. As concluded in the SA Evaluation Approach Paper and the Bangladesh Country Study, retrospective PIMS marking of RNR projects that started before introduction of PIMS in 1993, was inconsistent. Marking of projects started after 1993 has generally been consistent.<sup>4</sup>

4.2 Within the RNR sector, DFID has supported activities within the agriculture/livestock, forestry and wildlife sectors. Forestry support included the Indigenous Forest Conservation Project (KIFCON), which ceased in 1994 with the decision not to proceed with a second phase, and a large research project on timber properties implemented from the mid to late 1990s.<sup>5</sup> DFID also supported organisational development of the Kenya Wildlife Service through the Protected Area and Wildlife Services Interim Support Project (PAWSIS), which ended in 1999. In both the wildlife and forest sectors, the lack of commitment by government partners was a major driver for the decline in support over the study period. Although wildlife and forestry were supported by other DFID strategies – Biodiversity and Forestry – there is no evidence that either strategy presented an approach which was any more effective than the SAS at addressing the fundamental problem of working within an unsupportive policy and institutional environment.

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<sup>4</sup> The Oxfam Wajir Pastoralists Programme (DFID support started in 1994) has no SA Marker, although it is generally acknowledged that management of RNR resources is an important facet of the programme.

<sup>5</sup> DFID Kenya has, since 1999, re-entered the sector by extending modest support to NGOs to facilitate their participation in the process of redrafting Kenyan forest legislation.

4.3 Within the SAG portfolio, financial support levels were maintained in absolute terms over the 1990s, although they will decline post FY 99/00 in the absence of new support to GoK.

### **SAG strategy development**

4.4 At the start of the 1990s, DFID support to sustainable agriculture mainly comprised a series of projects which supported GoK's national agricultural research and communications services. DFID had supported district level agriculture service delivery activities, principally through the EMI project. Although EMI had recently ended, there was the expectation that new district level investments would be identified and supported. Almost all support was in support of government, either national or local level, and there is no evidence of support to NGOs or civil society in general.

4.5 The July 1991 DFID RNR Strategy, reflecting the then RNR programme, identified two broad areas of future support. First, to sustainable smallholder agriculture (service provision, infrastructure and policy reform were identified as key constraints to long-term growth) and second, to RNR management (forestry and wildlife). Possible support identified within the first area, effectively those investments that would now receive a principal SA PIMS marker, included:

- Engagement in policy development and reform with GoK and with other donors, principally the World Bank.
- Influencing the national research and development agencies through supporting district level government to deliver co-ordinated and strengthened services.
- Supporting organisational development within the national agricultural research system.

4.6 The 1991 strategy further stated that the major focus of DFID support should be on impact in the high and medium agricultural potential areas. Impacts in the low potential areas (ASALs) was expected to come through district focused support.



4.7 The Senior RNR Adviser died in 1991 and the office decided not to fill the position, so leaving one RNR Adviser to cover three country programmes. Development of the SA programme drifted somewhat in the early 1990s, probably reflecting the shortage of professional RNR staffing within DFID (EA) and the interest of the then programme officer in the politically higher profile forest and wildlife sectors, rather than agriculture. The clearest indications of this were management of the design process for NARP II, which was adversely affected by the lack of a champion with a clear vision of the purpose of the proposed phase II and in the lack of progress in developing a new, district based project to succeed EMI.

4.8 1994 was the key year for understanding subsequent programme development, with:

- A new senior RNR Adviser arriving in the office.
- A scoping study to initiate drafting a new RNR strategy being commissioned.
- After a period of uncertainty lasting over 18 months, a decision being taken by DFID to support NARP II, which subsequently became the dominant project by expenditure within the SA programme.
- In response to criticism that the DFID Kenya programme was not sufficiently poverty focused, development of what would become the Direct Funding Initiative<sup>6</sup> led the new Senior SDA. Nearly all SA projects designed and implemented since 1995 have been within the DFI (see Figure 1).
- Driven by the World Bank, discussions between GoK and the donors, on development of an Agriculture Sector Investment Programme, starting.
- The decision by DFID (EA) not to proceed with a second phase of KIFCON due to the lack of GoK support clearly indicating to the Senior RNR Adviser that any new large investments with GoK would only be supported within the office if there was clear evidence of GoK support for the requisite reform.

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<sup>6</sup> The DFI was established in early 1994 as a means of enhancing the poverty focus of DFID's programmes in East Africa. Major differences in the approach from other DFID support included the clear focus on direct impacts on the poor and the decision that NGOs rather than GoK would be the major partner. The expectation was that NGOs would eventually become mainstreamed within DFID's eastern Africa programme.

4.9 The scoping study (published May 1995) was carried out by consultants prior to the formulation of the 1995 RNRCSP and identified that the then SA portfolio was primarily focused on support for upstream research and other government service delivery due to DFID's withdrawal of support from other areas, principally infrastructure development. The then programme was identified as being very limited and relatively high risk. Importantly, the study pointed out that unless resources to the sector were increased substantially above their then level of around £5 million per annum, the medium term commitment to research would severely limit the scope for DFID to rapidly develop an executable strategy radically different from that reflected in the then programme. The study identified a wide range of possible interventions under three broad headings – District/Area based options, service support options and policy level options. The SAS was briefly identified in the scoping study, but there is nothing within the report that indicates that the SAS significantly affected the recommendations included. This conclusion is supported by the Senior RNR Adviser.

4.10 DFID's new Kenya RNR strategy was published in late 1995. Major elements of the strategy are summarised below in Table 4 but the major determinants of what outputs were identified in the RNRCSP were the general strategy of the office (for example by restricting what could be considered), historical commitments (principally to research and communications) and what was then considered good practice. There is no evidence that the SAS had any significant impact upon the contents of the 1995 RNRCSP or on the concurrent development of the 1995 Kenya CSP.

**Table 4 Logframe elements from the 1995 Kenya RNRCSP**

<b>Goal</b>	Poverty in Kenya reduced through sustainable improvements in NR-based incomes, enhanced livelihood security and increased availability of produce at affordable prices.
<b>Purpose</b>	Improved access by rural communities, in particular small and medium-scale farmers and pastoralists, to efficient demand-driven services, technologies, advice, and information on a sustained basis.
<b>Output 1</b>	Technologies appropriate to the needs and circumstances of low-income rural producers developed by research using adaptive and farmer-participatory approaches (Project: NARP II).
<b>Output 2</b>	Improved flow of agricultural and other developmental information to rural Kenyans, especially women, on a sustainable basis (Project: STEP/Rural Radio).
<b>Output 3</b>	Sustainable management of wildlife ecosystems and biodiversity for the economic benefit of the nation and the people living in those ecosystems (Project: PAWS)
<b>Output 4</b>	Government assisted in redefining its role in providing rural services in relation to the private sector and alternative service delivery systems.
<b>Output 5</b>	Enhanced functioning of liberalised markets for inputs and high-value commodities which can be produced by small and medium-scale farmers e.g. milk, horticultural products.
<b>Output 6</b>	Technologies which maintain the productivity of the underlying resource base applied at farm level.

4.11 Comparing the major areas of support identified in the SAS<sup>7</sup> and the 1991 and 1995 RNR strategies shows broad agreement between the three. The major differences between the three strategies are that the 1994 SAS and 1995 RNRCSP both explicitly identify support for liberalisation and the private sector, which was absent from the 1991 Kenya RNR strategy and they both give the need for participatory approaches a higher profile. This tends to support conclusions that the SAS was a statement of what was then considered ‘good practice’ within the DFID RNR advisory corps rather than a statement aimed at outlining what were the major gaps in practice.

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<sup>7</sup> The SAS identifies major areas of support at country level as being:

- i. Support to policy formulation and institutional reform, including support for information systems designed to facilitate decision-making, taking full account of sustainable resource management, within the framework of economic reform;
- ii. Capacity building and human resource development, including training;
- iii. Resource assessment and sustainable resource management;
- iv. Participatory approaches to development, to research and technology transfer within the context of sustainable RNR production systems;
- v. Identification and promotion of technologies that maintain or enhance the sustainable use or conservation of the NR base;
- vi. Facilitating private sector involvement in RNR ‘input’ supply, extension, marketing and research, whilst refining the core regulatory role of government.

4.12 Subsequent support by NRPAD to the Kenya office focused on implementation of the 1995 RNRCSP. There is no evidence of the SAS being publicised outside of DFID or subsequently used within the Kenya programme as a framework for discussion between NRPAD, the Kenya Senior RNR Adviser and the rest of the Kenya office.

## CHAPTER 5

### PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

#### Impact of the RNRCS

5.1 The 'good practice' approaches to implementation outlined in the RNRCS, such as focusing on capacity building and participation, are common to all investments designed from 1995 onwards, although it isn't possible to say that this is because of the RNRCS. Such approaches to implementation are common across donors and sectors.

5.2 Six possible programme outputs are identified in the 1995 RNRCS of which 5 are relevant to the SAS (see Table 4). Project activities supporting two outputs were ongoing when the RNRCS was published. The evaluation concludes in the 1995 RNRCS has had little impact upon the selection of projects/ interventions actually supported post 1995 (see Fig. 1).

5.3 Major influences on the programme developed post 1995 have been:

- GoK's unwillingness to consistently pursue and implement economic and public administrative reform which led to the progressive hardening in DFID's stance against direct support to GoK organisations over most of the period and which culminated in the low-case scenario identified in the 1998 CSP. This invalidated the major assumption that under-pinned the 1995 RNRCS;
- Development of the DFI approach which offered the possibility of achieving impacts without commitment from GoK to reform;
- Historical funding commitments to supporting GoK provision of research and communication services;
- Publication of DFID's new White Paper in 1997.

5.4 This begs the question of what, in the presence of reform, would have been the value of the RNRCS to programme management? Review of the RNRCS is as

interesting for what was not included as for what was. A general definition of a strategy is:

The long-term approach adopted to matching an organisation's capabilities and resources with its external environment in order to meet the expectations and objectives of the organisation's stakeholders.

5.5 The RNRCSF did not meet several of the criteria that one could expect within an operationally relevant strategy. The RNRCSF only briefly discussed DFID comparative advantage, it did not discuss the prioritisation of resources (principally funding) against the objectives stated or how resources, approaches and DFID competencies would be combined to implement the strategy. It is probable that the RNRCSF should not be regarded as a sector strategy, but rather a statement of the strategic intent of the Senior RNR Adviser.

5.6 Development of a new SA programme to reflect the outputs shown in the RNRCSF would have required *substantial* new resourcing by DFID due to the level of existing commitments relative to then funding levels. Neither the RNRCSF itself, nor the 1995 CSP, included any such commitment to expand funding for SA related activities. A major role of the RNRCSF would therefore have been in influencing the allocation of future unallocated funds within the whole country programme as a pre-requisite for developing new investments. Reviewing what actually occurred, while successive aid frameworks offered the possibility of at least maintaining the level of DFID support to Kenya, sectoral advisers between 1995 and 1999 worked in a context of a perceived declining pot of money for sectoral initiatives and therefore constant competition for funds between the sectors. The fact that the RNRCSF was never updated suggests that the Senior RNR Advisers did not see written statements of intent as an effective approach to influencing spend within the programme.

### **Actual programme management**

5.7 Within the RNR sector, commitments made and activities identified pre 1995 account for the bulk of post 1995 expenditure. These mostly relate to activities under

outputs 1 and 2 in the 1995 RNRCSP logframe and projects under the DFI. As commitments to support under programme outputs 1 and 2 have been discharged no new commitments in these areas have been made. For example, the decision not to extend further support to the Kenyan Agricultural Research Institute (under a NARP III) was due to an assessment that further support would not be effective in the absence of wider economic and public administrative reform.

5.8 Efforts to develop significant new activities in programme output areas 4 and 5 were protracted (1994-98) and eventually unsuccessful due to the failure of the ASIP design process. This had a consequential negative impact on the possibilities of developing a DFID area based project to support piloting of alternative service delivery mechanisms, for which implementation of the ASIP was a pre-condition. ASIP design was mostly driven by internal IDA needs rather than by an assessment by GoK and the wider range of donors supporting the sector that conditions were conducive for developing the SIP approach and was therefore both high risk and political in nature. For example, Harrold (1995)<sup>8</sup> laid out six preconditions for successful design and implementation of a SIP which were mostly not met in Kenya. The high risk nature of the design process and the limited opportunities for DFID to influence the design process were both recognised by the DFID Senior RNR Adviser and this assessment was subsequently reflected in the limited level of participation and resources devoted to the process by DFID. However, even if the ASIP had gone ahead, there was no guarantee that the office would have been willing to agree to significant DFID support (see 1995 & 1998 CSPs).

5.9 The major focus of new RNR support to Kenya, post 1995, has been through the DFI, which is only briefly discussed in the RNRCSP.<sup>9</sup> Projects under DFI could be justified on grounds of direct impacts on the poor and didn't, in theory, require significant GoK reform but rather creation of strong CBOs that represented the interests of the poor,

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<sup>8</sup> P. Harrold and Associates, *The Broad Sector Approach to Investment Lending: Sector Investment Programs*, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 302, Washington, DC, 1995.

<sup>9</sup> The Smallholder Dairy project is the only significant SA project that is not under the DFI that was developed post

as the basis for sustained impact. They therefore accorded with the developing strategy of the office, which was formalised as the low case scenario in the 1998 CSP.

5.10 The focus on developing the DFI projects and a limited investment in projects such as the Smallholder Dairy Project, is a rational and reasonable management response to the actual situation faced with its limited opportunities for effective engagement with GoK. However, appointment of a World Bank supported 'Change Team' within GoK in late 1999 has opened up the possibility of substantial GoK economic and public administration reform and high-lights a potential future RNR programme management issue.

5.11 Constructive interaction between the SDAs who were initially central to DFI management and the Senior RNR Advisers, with access to the required funding, was a feature of the DFI programme during the study period. However, this working relationship is becoming less close as the SDAs become increasingly involved in development of Kenya's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) and the Civil Society Adviser has assumed the role formerly taken by the SDAs. These relationships contrast with a lack of evidence of influence by other cross-cutting advisers, principally the governance and economics advisers, in the RNR programme. Evidence presents the somewhat paradoxical situation in which, while the RNR advisers and cross-cutting advisers are aware of, and devote considerable time to commenting on, each others work there is a lack of evidence of influence of the cross-cutters on the RNR strategy and of the experience of the RNR sector on DFID work at a strategic level. This potential increases the risk that the RNR programme will not be firmly embedded within a wider DFID/donor/GoK programme supporting economic and public administration reform and therefore misses both opportunities to inform the wider debate and support and also seek areas of synergy.



5.12 While the SL approach offers potential in these areas, it appears to have had little impact on the Kenya programme's development to date. Initial attempts by the Senior RNR Adviser to develop a district based SL project in 1999, using NGOs as the primary management partner, did not progress beyond the PCN stage. There was scepticism in the office over what was new in the proposal presented. There is little evidence that either advisers or administrators see how the approach can add value to the disciplinary approaches already in place. Discussion has focused on how to use the SL 'framework' rather than on the SL principles<sup>10</sup> and their implications for programme development and management.

5.13 Recent work by the Senior RNR Adviser to address influencing the wider policy agenda, such as support to Land Tenure Reform and community consultation on the Forest Bill, is based on increasing voice by NGOs, and the poor, in policy formulation and possible changes in the enabling environment and the approach is clearly based on the approaches developed under the DFI. However, these activities have not arisen through application of a SL approach, albeit strengthening sustainable livelihoods is their objective.

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<sup>10</sup> C. Ashley and D. Carney, *Sustainable Livelihoods: Lessons from Early Experience*, London: DFID, 1999, p. 7.

**Figure 1 SA Projects in Kenya programme (91/92-98/99)**

<b>Project</b>	<b>91/92</b>	<b>92/93</b>	<b>93/94</b>	<b>94/95</b>	<b>95/96</b>	<b>96/97</b>	<b>97/98</b>	<b>98/99</b>	<b>99/00</b>	<b>00- Ongoing</b>	<b>Commitment £ '000</b>
<i>Support to research</i>											
NARP I	87-94										7,640
NARP II	94-00										11,000
KETRI II	87-96										1,991
KETRI III	94-02									Yes	2,382
Support for Smallholder Dairy I	97-99										652
Support for Smallholder Dairy II	99-03									Yes	1,320
Tea Research Foundation	94-96										149
Animal Traction Network	94-99										143
ApproTec Irrigation pedal pump	96-98										252
Plantation Grown Timber	94-99										987
<i>Communications</i>											
AIC II	87-92										650
AIC: (STEP)	92-00									Yes	710
Radio Project, I	87-95										241
Radio Project, II	94-00										434
<i>DFI Projects</i>											
ABLH	95-00										1,989
Dairy Goat & Animal Health	96-02									Yes	1,133
Kwale Rural Support	95-00									Yes	1,100
Sabatia Food Security	99-03									Yes	264
Support to Decentralised Animal Health & Ethnoveterinary	99-02									Yes	275
<i>Other</i>											
Isiolo Livestock Dev	87-91										660

## CHAPTER 6

### PROJECT EFFECTIVENESS

#### General

6.1 Overall ratings in PCRs of the achievement of objectives 48 projects completed in Kenya between 1991 and 1999 are summarised in Table 5. Performance of those falling under sustainable agriculture appears slightly worse than that of the general population of projects but, given the small sample size, it is difficult to assess the significance of this difference. In the opinion of the Kenya Programme Officer, effectiveness in most sectors, outside of health and population, has been comparable. The generally high scores given to projects within the PCRs is somewhat puzzling given the lack of reform by GoK.

**Table 5 Summary of overall ratings within PCRs of achievement of objectives in Kenya programme, 1992-99 (No. of projects)**

<b>Rating</b>	<b>Sustainable Ag. Investments</b>	<b>Other Investments</b>
Likely to be completely achieved	0	8
Likely to be largely achieved	5	23
Likely to be partially achieved	2	8
Only likely to be achieved to a very limited extent	1	0
Unlikely to be realised	0	1
Too early to judge the extent of achievement	–	–
Number of projects	8	40

6.2 Assessments of actual or likely achievements of project outputs, purposes and goals for SA projects reviewed during the SA evaluation are summarised in Table 6.

**Table 6 Summary of rating of performance of reviewed projects**

<b>Project</b>	<b>Output</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Goal</b>
NARP II	2	4	4
R&D support to the smallholder dairy sector	1	X	X
Smallholder Marketing and Certification	2	2	X
Dairy Goat and Animal Healthcare	2	3	X
Oxfam Wajir Pastoralists Programme	2	2	3
Kwale Rural Support Programme	2	3	X
Key:	1 = Likely to be completely achieved; 2 = likely to be largely achieved; 3= likely to be partially achieved; 4= only likely to be achieved to a very limited extent; 5= unlikely to be realised; X= too early to judge		

## **NARP II**

6.3 DFID support during NARP I, 1987-1994, focused on organisational strengthening, training and support for strategic research. Design of NARP II started in 1992. PEC approval was gained in late 1994, before production of the RNRCSP in 1995. Design process management was poor, due to uncertainty over the direction of the Kenya programme in 1992-94 and a lack of a central unifying vision within the DFID (Kenya) team on the project's purpose. The newly appointed Senior RNR Adviser arrived in post, in 1994, to find a draft Project Memorandum and decided to support project implementation, on the grounds that agricultural research was seen as a comparative advantage of DFID's,<sup>11</sup> further delay increased the danger of the collapse of the on-going research support and there was the option to redesign the project during its MTR. Especially given the almost concurrent decision not to proceed with a second phase of KIFCON, the decision to proceed with a project operating under many of the same institutional constraints and which would tie up almost half the then allocated RNR budget for several years can only be seen as a high risk strategy.

6.4 The initial project was designed as a framework, encompassing 11 almost independent sub-components supporting two major themes. First, continued support for a series of technical research projects started under NARP I and second, a series of activities contributing to developing the technical research skills and research management capacity of KARI staff termed institutional strengthening.

6.5 The 1996 Mid-term review highlighted that few of the sub-components were using participatory research approaches (as recommended in both the SAS and RNRCSP). The project purpose was reformulated with an emphasis on research that responded to farmer and extension demands. The 11 separate research components were dissolved into teams grouped around three new outputs,<sup>12</sup> with responsibility for

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<sup>11</sup> As reconfirmed in the 1995 SAS itself.

<sup>12</sup> New outputs were (1) Appropriate technologies identified, developed and validated; (2) Improved institutional capacity; (3) New and existing technologies packaged and supplied for uptake.

delivering outputs being shifted from TCOs to OVI Leaders drawn from KARI staff. There was a strong recommendation that the level of participation by and consultation with farmers be increased in research. The project's Final Review (Bazeley *et al.*, 1999) concluded that the MTR had a significant effect on the project approach and that the project was very efficient at achieving its recast outputs. However, NARP II is unlikely to be effective. Impacts will mostly be confined to a relatively small number of farmers directly involved in on-farm research.

6.6 The SAS evaluation team<sup>13</sup> concludes that effectiveness has been severely constrained by the failure of three major design assumptions which were beyond the control of the project:

- 1 . Cessation of IDA support to GoK's ag. extension services in 1996 has led to a virtual collapse in extension services. NARP II responded by investigating alternative delivery systems but work was limited to a number of pilots and KARI's ability to carry on the work is severely limited.
- 2 . KARI has traditionally been a supply driven organisation and while DFID support has had some impact on re-orientating researchers at field level, the ability of these researchers to carry on such work post donor support is unsustainable since the organisation remains supply driven at central level. Support from all donors under NARP II could be criticised for being too focused on organisational development rather than organisational change.
- 3 . It was assumed that a decrease in staffing levels would free up GoK resources that could then be used to support operational activities. This has not occurred.

### **R&D support to the smallholder dairy sector**

6.7 The Smallholder Dairy Project (SDP) is a collaborative research and development project between ILRI/ KARI and MoA and the only SA project designed and implemented post 1995 that includes a significant role for government and is not under the DFI. The first phase, 1997-1999, was designed to investigate and evaluate the current milk production situation in peri-urban areas around Nairobi, identify researchable

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<sup>13</sup> These assumptions are not within the project logframe although they are discussed in both the MTR and the project's

constraints to milk production and identify, and prioritise, possible ‘best bet’ solutions. Implementation on a trial basis of one technical solution, the re-allocation of concentrate feed, started towards the end of Phase 1. Phase I was designed on the assumption that DFID would provide support for a Phase II.

6.8 Phase II (1999-2003) activities include further on-farm research into the effectiveness and impact of concentrate feed re-allocation in peri-urban Nairobi, extending project support to Western Kenya; identification and research into further best-bet interventions to increase milk income; the design of delivery and delivery of marketing interventions and extension messages.

6.9 SDP is a good example of a project that supports the sustainable intensification of agriculture, and therefore is an example of what the Sustainable Agricultural Strategy (SAS) was seeking to support, although there is no evidence that the SAS directly influenced design of this project. Its approach incorporates many of the principles outlined in the SAS and effectiveness has been significantly enhanced by research findings from four completed/ongoing DFID-LPP grants (RNRKS) and one DFID-NRS grant. ILRI has been very successful at using the RNRKS to develop a substantial research and development programme to support sustainable agricultural intensification in the smallholder dairy sector. This project adds value to other DFID funded research and development work in the smallholder dairy sector in Kenya and outside – in Tanzania, Ghana and Bolivia.

6.10 Technical collaboration between the project, the private sector, co-operatives and farmers in Phase II has been well received by partners. Identification of policy, technical and socio-economic constraints, knowledge gaps and investment opportunities is led by the project, with no consultation with co-operatives, self-help groups or other membership/ representative groups of smallholder dairy farmers in the prioritisation of the ‘best bet’ interventions and research topics. However, this is unlikely to undermine

impact in terms of increased milk production and incomes, as each intervention is to be validated on farm by farmers.

6.11 The project is notable for the outstanding quality of its research and its efforts to address non-technical constraints to marketing of milk. It is also notable in that documentation, especially the project's logframes, has not reflected the real balance of activities carried out by the project. While the project is constrained by the same overall poor institutional environment that adversely affected effectiveness of NARP II, the project is highly proactive at trying to influence the policy environment. Key to the dissemination strategy is that the project manager is not a researcher, but an officer from MoA who is also the Chair of the Dairy Policy Development Committee and a member of the Agricultural Sector Investment Programme (ASIP) committee. However, such activities are not reflected in project logframes, although they are essential if the stated outputs are to have significant impact on the Phase II goal, 'contribution to sustainable improvements in the livelihoods of poor people in Kenya'.

### **Smallholder Marketing and Certification Project (SMCP)**

6.12 The Association for Better Land Husbandry (an NGO based in the UK, with a Kenyan subsidiary) identified this project and the associated Organic Matter Management Network (funded through DFID's Civil Society Challenge Fund, formerly the Joint Funding Scheme). ABLH was established in 1993 with a mission to identify and promote low-cost methods of conservation-based farming that reduce poverty, improve rural people's livelihoods and boost rural economies, particularly following discussions at an international conference in 1991.

6.13 SMCP started in 1996 and was funded under the DFI. DFID support to a second phase is currently under discussion. It has (1) formed a network of farmer groups to promote technologies for conservation-farming, which (2) in association with a UK Soil Association accredited certification scheme will (3) allow marketing in Kenyan and European markets with an organic label, and (4) formed a limited company, Farmer's



Own Ltd, to process farmers' produce under the 'conservation supreme' brand name. Farmer Action Associations have been established in target areas in western and central Kenya.

6.14 The success of the project is mixed. The project has had an impact on agricultural practices and resulting incomes among direct participants in a number of areas, and has facilitated links among farmers and between farmer groups and the government or private sector. The project has engaged farmers' enthusiasm and interest for technologies such as double-dug beds, which increase production at low cost. By early 2000, the project was working with over 2300 households through 10 Farmer Action Associations. However, the project had a goal target of 5000 households, the project allegedly has poor relations with government extension staff, and there has been dissatisfaction among project staff. Processing and marketing of produce through the Farmers' Own Ltd company has not been commercially viable, and little income has been generated through micro-businesses. There appears to be no impact beyond directly participating households, and evidence for replication of practices beyond the target areas, and influence on partners, as yet remain optimistic assertions. The project seems to be faltering in achieving its purpose – 'to demonstrate that smallholder incomes can be increased significantly through the development of sustainable farmer controlled businesses producing and marketing produce into domestic and international markets'.

6.15 Monitoring of the impact of the project on poverty, or ecological sustainability has been episodic or absent, and some reviews of the project are accused of exaggeration of the project's success. DFID had until recently experienced difficulty overseeing project performance due to significant variance between consultants' reports on the project. Recently, a degree of consensus on the project has been prompted by preparations for a Phase 2 project.

## **Dairy Goat and Animal Healthcare**

6.16 In 1995 GoK made a direct request to the INGO Farm Africa to develop a dairy project in Meru District. DFID funded a project planning study during 1995, and a three year proposal for funding under the DFI was accepted by DFID in 1996. A second phase is being funded (1999-2002). The project focuses on two main issues: crossing local goats with exotic Toggenburg goats to increase their size and open up the possibilities of keeping goats for milk, as well as meat and manure production; and increasing access of small farmers to formal sector veterinary services – principally drugs – after the virtual collapse of GoK funding for veterinary services.

6.17 The project approach owes much to previous Farm Africa work in Tanzania and Ethiopia and the general approach of the DFI projects, which rely on fostering local CBOs to ensure sustainability. The project is mainly technology driven with a capacity building component through animal management and health care training. Overall, the project has been technically efficient. Animal numbers are expanding satisfactorily with significant demand for live sales of both pure and cross-bred animals and strong price premiums over local animals. The health care component has trained community animal health workers (CAHWs) and linked them through animal health assistants and private veterinarians into a drug supply chain. Project loans to health care suppliers are being repaid, and participants are earning a modest income. It will be impossible to tell whether the health care component, which benefits mainly cattle owners, will meet targets for improving production levels because of lack of data. Recently, the project has become involved in the on-going national policy debate about implementing decentralised animal health.

6.18 Major sustained poverty impacts rely mostly on widespread ownership of the cross-bred goats by smallholder farmers. The project's group approach offers possibilities of enhancing impacts. For example, in some cases income from animal sales has been used to benefit poorer members, allowing purchase of local goats for members initially without animals. However, it is questionable whether a realistic approach to creating

viable and independent SHGs has been developed by the project, which has surprisingly little knowledge of lessons learnt elsewhere in SHG formation. For example, the project neither has knowledge of Action Aid (Kenya)'s DFI supported work in this area nor has it identified a set of indicators to assess how its SHGs are progressing towards independent operation. Replicability of the approach assumes that MoA extension staff act as trainers. However, MoA staff are unlikely to be able to work as effectively with scattered individuals as they would with pre-formed groups, even assuming they had sufficient operational funding, which they plainly do not.

6.19 M&E has been a notable weakness of the project. To date, logframe OVIs have been mostly focused on technical issues and have not included issues of operational sustainability of the SHGs. DFID monitoring has been deficient since observations/recommendations have not been followed through into changes in project implementation. In practice, the project implementers do not understand the principles of an M&E system, openly stating that design of an M&E system has been delayed until phase 2 and agreement on indicators will not occur until March 2001, only one year before the project ends.

### **Oxfam Wajir Pastoralists Programme (WPDP)**

6.20 Wajir District lies in the north-east of Kenya, and experiences problems of range management, water scarcity and conflict that are typical of the arid and semi-arid lands in Kenya. The area is inhabited by a mixture of longterm resident Somali pastoralist clans and other pastoralists arriving from Somalia over the past few years. WPDP emerged out of Oxfam's presence in Wajir District in response to a series of severe droughts and the *Wagalla* conflict between pastoralist clans in 1984. Following major drought relief in 1991/92, Oxfam carried out extensive PRA exercises with pastoralists and put together a long-term strategic plan to reduce vulnerability over 1992-94. Phase I of the project, funded under the DFI, funded initial implementation of first part of this strategy. A second phase of the project started in 1999.

6.21 WPDP has: facilitated the formation of a network of pastoralists associations, womens' groups, and other community groups in two divisions of Wajir District; provided technical support to enable these groups to rehabilitate water points; supported community animal and human health workers (*daryelles*, and traditional birth attendants [TBAs]); and assisted with restocking. The major rationale for DFID support under the DFI was for community development and the project was not seen as an RNR focused intervention, although management of RNR resources have been a significant issue for the community groups.

6.22 The project has achieved a high degree of success, despite interruptions due to severe droughts and an equally devastating flood. It has repeatedly overreached its output targets related to the formation of community groups, training of *daryelles* and TBAs, restocking and rehabilitation/upgrading of wells, water pans, and boreholes. The project management team deserve congratulations for this high degree of success, which is due in large part to a demand-led approach involving considerable beneficiary participation. The success is also related to the urgency felt by all in Wajir District to improve their situation. Calculations based on reduced livestock mortality, increased milk production, and returns on credit suggest that the project has yielded an internal rate of return of 55%.

6.23 The project has focused on the household level and cites evidence that the proportion of households receiving food aid in project target areas is lower than in the areas where it as not been active (45% against 63%) and that the number of days per year that households require food aid has been reduced. As the beneficiaries build their livelihoods, however, demands for further assistance with technical matters such as livestock marketing are likely to increase, and if the pastoralist associations cannot demonstrate their value to their members and other beneficiaries, they are likely to be unsustainable.

6.24 The sustainability of the pastoral associations and particularly of the committees established to link them to district decision-makers will also be in doubt unless they can

demonstrate their effectiveness in influencing decision-makers. Therein lies the challenge for pastoralists development. The project has latterly devoted greater attention to forming these links between pastoralist groups and decision-making structures of the district, but there are fears that changing such unresponsive structures would require higher-level national change. In turn, this change looks unlikely in the short-term.

### **Kwale Rural Support Programme**

6.25 The Kwale Rural Support Programme (KRSP), 1997-2000, developed out of the Aga Khan Health Service's primary health care (PHC) project in Kwale District. PHC concluded that sustainable improvements in health status required parallel improvements in food security and incomes. Design of KRSP by the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) drew extensively from AKF's integrated rural development experience from Pakistan and India. Discussions with DFID (EA) during design focused on two issues – whether DFID (EA) should invest in an area outside either the high-medium areas where the greatest concentration of the poor live or the marginal pastoral areas where the poorest are found and on the effectiveness of integrated rural development projects. DFID reservations about the project approach have proven well-founded during implementation.

6.26 The project works in three locations with a population of about 70,000 (approximately 11,660 households). Its goal is to establish sustainable and equitable improvements in the livelihoods of poorer households. Its purpose is to establish viable and sustainable CBOs at sub-village, village and supra-village levels that enable communities to raise income levels.<sup>14</sup> CBOs have been established and following PRA and participatory appraisals, investments in productive physical infrastructure (PPI), for example dams, wells and roads, have been made. This has served to enhance the project's credibility, especially with local leaders. The project has a significant sustainable agricultural component – including dams, soil and water conservation measures and prawn production and fish ponds.

6.27 Project design and management have been poor, although with backstopping from the AKF Nairobi and Geneva offices, project management have responded to DFID concerns. As with other DFI projects included in this evaluation, there are concerns about the institutional sustainability of the CBOs created. KRSP's institutional strategy is not under-pinned by a detailed analysis of what is required but rather focuses on general statements about strengthening social capital (CBOs), village development (endowment) funds and GoK extension services. Both institutional sustainability and the sustainability of credit funds were seriously questioned in the first OPR (12 months into implementation) and a new output one added to the logframe on viable CBOs, which includes a set of extremely ambitious OVIs to better measure financial, organisational and managerial capacity and transparency.identified that the majority of CBO members were not from poor households and that neither CBO leadership nor the project perceived this as a problem. KRSP has responded to this issue, although it is still too early to establish whether the project's responses will lead to increased participation by the poor in CBO decision-making.

6.28 Monitoring and evaluation capacity within the project has also been poor, although an M&E officer has recently been recruited.

6.29 Funding of a second phase by DFID is under discussion, although AKF will continue support even if DFID (EA) do not agree to funding a second phase.

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<sup>14</sup> The logframe has been revised (1999-2001) and will take the project beyond its present funding period. The purpose statement has been slightly revised but the essential difference is the addition of an output 'Viable and sustainable CBOs established'.

## CHAPTER 7

### PROGRAMME IMPACT AND INFLUENCE

#### General

7.1 The 1995 RNRCSP and logframe (see Table 4) have not been updated. There is little reason to believe that programme management's opinion on what the expected impacts should be have significantly changed between 1995 and 2000. Goal and purpose level statements and OVIs are presented below:

Goal	OVIs
Poverty in Kenya reduced through sustainable improvements in NR-based incomes, enhanced livelihood security and increased availability of produce at affordable prices.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Quality and security of livelihoods raised.</li><li>2. Availability of produce at affordable prices increased.</li></ol>
Purpose	
Improved access by rural communities, in particular small- and medium-scale farmers and pastoralists, to efficient demand-driven services, technologies, advice, and information on a sustained basis.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Household income derived from use of natural resources by small and medium farmers increased.</li><li>2. Livelihood security of pastoralists and others living in the ASAL enhanced; migration rates to ASAL reduced.</li><li>3. Natural resources accessible to target groups maintained or improved.</li></ol>

7.2 What is clear from previous discussion in Chapter 6 is that the programme implemented post 1995 cannot be presented as a coherent set of projects which are tightly focused on impacting at national level on the above OVIs. Impacts have generally been with those farmers that the projects have directly worked with.

#### Direct impact on the poor

7.3 All projects reviewed in this evaluation can demonstrate at least a *potential* for direct impact upon those small- and medium-sized farmers directly involved with the

projects in their area based activities.<sup>15</sup> Three of the four DFI projects – the Farm Africa Dairy Goat Project, the ABLH Smallholder Marketing and Certification Project and the Oxfam Pastoralist Development Project in Wajir – and also the Smallholder Dairy Project are all located in geographical areas with high levels of poverty. In contrast, most of the remainder of the SA programme, which is comprised of research projects, had a national rather than area focus.

7.4 Major direct project impacts identified fall in two main areas. First, greater opportunities for farmers and pastoralists to increase agricultural productivity. Second, particularly within the DFI projects, increased social capital, through formation of the CBOs and SHGs.

7.5 Reviews of NARP II, SDP and KETRI III (end-of-project review of KETRI III) suggest evidence that technologies have been identified that have potential for enhancing productivity. However, few objective or quantified data exist on which to estimate levels of adoption or impact on productivity for technologies identified or the socioeconomic status of the farmers adopting technologies developed under either NARP II or KETRI III, although the numbers of farmers involved are modest relative to the level of resourcing and length of commitment. In fact, the lack of objective and quantified data on impacts is a feature of most projects reviewed.

7.6 For SDP, models of production impact indicate that concentrate feed re-allocation has a potential net benefit of about UK£1.00/ day for the average smallholder. There are at least 200,000 smallholders in Central Kenya alone that could benefit, and it is estimated that the value of accumulated benefits would be at least UK£46m. SDP's relatively modest cost and focus from its inception on working with a wider range of potential dissemination partners outside of GoK raises the possibility that it will be more cost-effective than NARP II and KETRI III.

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<sup>15</sup> Barring NARP II, all projects reviewed have an area focus and even with NARP II, direct impacts identified have been due to area based research activities in high potential areas.



7.7 Within the DFI projects, Wajir has had impact on livestock numbers (restocking), livestock mortality, milk production, and water availability. The Dairy Goat and Animal Health Project has had impact on goat productivity among households directly involved in farmer groups. Data from the Smallholder Marketing and Certification Project aren't sufficient to judge impacts on farmer productivity. It is too early to comment on the possible impacts of Kwale Rural Development Project.

7.8 Particularly within the DFI projects, the enhancement of social capital has been assumed to be crucial to reducing poverty and strengthening livelihoods. Underpinning this approach is the assumption that top-down directive government and economic growth have not reduced poverty and the establishment of CBOs and SHGs, to enhance social capital, is crucial to achieving immediate poverty impacts, and in the longer term increasing the voice of the poor.

7.9 All the DFI projects have been successful at fostering creation of new CBOs and SHGs, although the level of participation by the poor within them has been variable. During project design, the Dairy Goat Project used participatory methods to identify the poor who would then become goat group members. SMCP documentation does not discuss what, if any, criteria were used by ABLH in defining its target group, however DFID (EA) was satisfied with the poverty reach on the basis of the data provided in a mid-term review. Documented evidence exists to show that the Oxfam project in Wajir has successfully reached poor pastoralists and it has demonstrated most strongly the impact of direct assistance to the poor. The PY2 OPR for the AKF Kwale Project highlights that the project lacked an approach to identifying the poor and that the poor were generally not members of the CBOs supported and there was insufficient data on the benefits to them of the productive physical infrastructure projects implemented by the CBOs. The project has subsequently implemented the recommendations of the OPR on addressing these issues but it is too early to say whether the response will solve these problems.

7.10 In all the DFI projects there are serious issues concerning the organisational sustainability of CBOs. Reasons vary, but common features are summarised below.

- A lack of the necessarily wide range of skills within the implementing NGOs. In three projects reviewed, it is probable that social analysis and community work skills were deficient. While conversely in the case of OXFAM Wajir, there was a lack of requisite technical skills to inform and enable the CBO to develop technical initiatives.
- Projects have often not been aware of the skills gaps within their teams and, when they have, have often not been very effective at addressing them in a timely manner.
- Logframes have been used in a mechanistic way as a tool for managing the relationship between DFID and project implementers. Attention has been focused on the outputs of the logframe, and not on monitoring at purpose and goal level and monitoring assumptions. Using the logframe approach (rather than simply using the logframe as a matrix) potentially would have high-lighted such assumptions about organisational and institutional sustainability.

7.11 In conclusion, the projects have had, or are likely to have, some impact at household level, on farm and livestock production, income and on access to services and infrastructure. Assessing the impact of these increases in agricultural productivity and social capital within the programme on livelihood outcomes and absolute poverty levels is severely hampered by the fact that only two projects, Wajir and SDP, have made systematic efforts to collect data with which assess impacts on livelihood outcomes and only Wajir's design was based using a poverty analysis.

### **National level impact**

7.12 There is no evidence of national level impacts to date on the sustainable intensification of agriculture.

7.13 Although a stated intention of the RNRCSP, opportunities to influence national policy have been limited and development of the ASIP has stalled. This evaluation

supports the major conclusion of the World Bank ICR of its Agricultural Sector Management II Project:<sup>16</sup>

In the process of inducing reform, technical assistance can be effective in providing analysis and guidance to Government. However, the actual implementation of genuine reform depends on clear commitment from Government and other stakeholders. Conditionality has not worked, and strengthening policy/analytical capacity has not yielded the intended impact in an environment in which all aspects of the reform process are politicised.

7.14 However, the perceived opening up of GoK to change since introduction of the national change management team in late 1999 offers potential for impact in the near future. The Dairy Goat Project is participating actively in policy debates about decentralised animal health services. SDP is very proactive in feeding implications of its research work into policy debates about the dairy industry. Two more recent pieces of work – Support to Land Tenure Reform and Support to Community Consultation on the Forest Bill – are both trying to address wider institutional issues.

7.15 It is possible that the AIC: (STEP) and Radio Project may have had impacts, but these projects were not reviewed during the evaluation. National level impacts from support to the national agricultural research system are unlikely until efficient and effective dissemination pathways are developed.

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<sup>16</sup> *Implementation Completion Report for Agricultural Sector Management II Project, Kenya*, Report No. 19442, World Bank, 16 June 1999.